In earlier arguments I was told by some posters (who don't know much about Iraq but support Bush regardless) that MY arguments for getting out of Iraq were just "liberal talk" and that if I were truly concerned (they say) about our military strength, I would be in support of the President, who argues that we must "stay the course" in Iraq.
Therefore I find it fascinating that several conservative think tank researchers who date back to the early Reagan period and before are beginning to doubt the Bush Doctrine. This leads me to think that the only defenders of Bush's Iraq policies are either those who are working for the president from within (like Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz) or media people who are not professional strategists or military people who have bought in to the Bush political side, people like O'Reilley and Hannity.
One of these conservatives who worked for Reagan and Bush I is Edward Luttwak. He reminds me of the German professional military class who tried to argue with Hitler that perhaps it wasn't wise to try to hold on to Stalingrad; that it would be better and wiser for the Wehrmacht to pull out of the city and withdraw strategically to fight another day. Of course, Hitler had politicized the military to such a degree that dissent was tantamount to treason. Such seems to be the case for any intelligent person today who DARES to ask strategic questions about why we are staying in Iraq, like General Anthony Zinni.
Here is Edward Luttwak's argument, from a conservative strategic standpoint:
"Time to Quit Iraq (Sort Of)
By EDWARD LUTTWAK
Published: August 18, 2004
Chevy Chase, Md. — Many Americans now believe that the United States is depleting its military strength, diplomatic leverage and Treasury to pursue unrealistic aims in Iraq. They are right. Democracy seems to interest few Iraqis, given the widespread Shiite proclivity to follow unelected clerics, the Sunni rejection of the principle of majority rule, and the preference of many Kurds for tribe and clan over elected governments. Reconstruction was supposed to advance rapidly with surging oil export revenues, but is hardly gaining on the continuing destruction inflicted by sabotage and thievery. And in any case, it is unlikely that the new Iraqi interim government will be able to oversee meaningful elections in a country where its authority is more widely denied than recognized.
Yet few Americans are prepared to simply abandon Iraq. For one, they are rightly concerned that to do so would be a mortal blow to America's global credibility and encourage violent Islamists everywhere. An outright withdrawal would leave the interim government and its feeble forces of doubtful loyalty to face the attacks of vastly emboldened Baath regime loyalists, Sunni revanchists, local and foreign Islamist extremists and the ever-more numerous Shiite militias. The likely result would be the defection of the government's army, police and national guard members, followed by a swift collapse and then civil war. Worse might follow in the Middle East - it usually does - even to the point of invasions by Iran, Turkey and possibly others, initiating new cycles of repression and violence.
Thus the likely consequences of an American abandonment are so bleak that few Americans are even willing to contemplate it. This is a mistake: it is precisely because unpredictable mayhem is so predictable that the United States might be able to disengage from Iraq at little cost, or even perhaps advantageously.
Here's why: In Iraq America faces several different enemies, as well as some remarkably unhelpful nominal allies. As things stand, their intense mutual hostility now brings no advantage to the United States. But all could be unbalanced by a well-devised policy of disengagement, and forced to stop harming American interests and possibly even serve them in some degree.
At present, because the United States is fully committed in Iraq, the Shiite followers of the renegade cleric Moktada al-Sadr feel free to attack the same American forces that elsewhere are fighting Sunnis bent on restoring their ancestral supremacy. Many Shiite clerics and the population at large - the very people the Sunnis are hoping to oppress once again - either applaud Mr. Sadr or do nothing to stop him.
But if the Shiites were persuaded that America might truly abandon them to face Saddam Hussein's loyalists alone, it seems certain that they would quickly revert to the attitude of collaboration with the occupation forces they showed in the aftermath of invasion..."
You can read the rest at the NY Times site:
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/18/opinion/18luttwak.html